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We study two-stage choice procedures in which the decision maker first preselects
the alternatives whose values according to a criterion pass a menu-dependent
threshold and then maximizes a second criterion to narrow the selection further.
This framework overlaps with several existing models that have various interpre-
tations and impose various additional restrictions on behavior. We show that the
general class of procedures is characterized by acyclicity of the revealed “first-
stage separation relation.”
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1. Introduction
Several recent contributions to axiomatic choice theory study two-stage procedures in
which, first, a subset of alternatives is preselected, and then a maximization operation
narrows the selection further. Examples include Cherepanov et al. (2013), Lleras et al.
(2010), Manzini and Mariotti (2007), Masatlioglu et al. (2012), and Tyson (2011). The
interpretations of these models vary considerably, with the preselection stage used in
Cherepanov et al. (2013) to express the desire for a psychological “rationalization” of
the eventual choice, in Lleras et al. (2010) to allow active consideration of a subset of
alternatives only, and in Manzini and Mariotti (2007) to capture a “noncompensatory
heuristic.”
In this paper, we investigate two-stage procedures in which the preselection mecha-
nism has a threshold representation of the sort considered by Aleskerov and Monjardet
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(2002) and Tyson (2008). Such a representation involves a criterion function f on the set
of alternatives and a threshold function θ on the set of menus. Alternative x is prese-
lected from menu A if its value f (x) is at least the threshold θ(A) assigned to this choice
problem. Writing g for the second-stage maximand, the solutions of the constrained
optimization problem
max
x∈A
g(x) subject to f (x)≥ θ(A)
are then the options selected from menu A by the full two-stage procedure.
This type of “two-stage threshold” (TST) representation is of interest because it over-
laps with a number of the theories of choice mentioned above. Cognitive mechanisms
for dealing with complex decision problems, such as attention and satisficing, are natu-
rally modeled with thresholds. And since the resulting preselection may be coarse, with
numerous alternatives achieving the threshold, a second criterion can help to further
refine the options.
Our goal is to determine how the TST representation constrains behavior indepen-
dently of any extra restrictions implied by more specific models. This is accomplished
by our main result, which characterizes the representation in terms of a single axiom on
the choice function. The axiom imposes acyclicity on the “first-stage separation rela-
tion” encoding when one alternative is chosen over another despite evidence that they
cannot be distinguished at the second stage. This is of course implied by the acyclicity
condition that characterizes the one-stage threshold model (a result included below for
the sake of comparison).
In general, the consequences of adding a second stage to a choice-theoretic model
can be difficult to predict. Allowing an ordinary preference maximizer to break his indif-
ference by maximizing a second criterion does not change the behavioral possibilities.1
In contrast, the TST model turns out to have considerably less empirical content than
its one-stage counterpart. This is shown most clearly by a corollary of our main result,
which states that for the special case of single-valued choice functions, the TST repre-
sentation places no constraints whatsoever on behavior. We conclude that models that
are consistent with the TST framework get most of their logical strength not from the
representation itself, but rather from the additional restrictions they impose.
We characterize TST representations in Section 2, discuss more specialized models
in Section 3, and prove our main result in Section 4.
2. Characterization results
Fix a nonempty, finite set X and let D ⊆ A = 2X \ {∅}. Each x ∈ X is an alternative and
each A ∈ D is a menu. A choice function is any C :D → A such that ∀A ∈ D we have
C(A)⊆A. Here C(A) is the choice set assigned to A, with the interpretation that those
and only those alternatives in C(A) can be chosen from this menu. Without loss of
generality, assume that ∀x ∈X we have {x} ∈ D.
1Lexicographic maximization of two weak orders is behaviorally equivalent to maximization of a single
weak order, both being characterized by Richter’s (1966, p. 637) congruence axiom.
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We study the class of choice functions that select alternatives from menu A by max-
imizing g(x) subject to f (x) ≥ θ(A), where fg :X →  and θ :D → . In the context
of such a representation, we refer to f as the primary criterion, to g as the secondary
criterion, and to θ as the threshold map. The triple 〈fθg〉 is called a profile.
We define first the threshold set that contains those alternatives on a menu that have
sufficiently high values of the primary criterion.
Definition 1. Given a pair 〈fθ〉 and an A ∈ D, let (A|fθ)= {x ∈A : f (x)≥ θ(A)}.
The model under investigation can now be defined formally.
Definition 2. A two-stage threshold representation of C is a profile 〈fθg〉 such that
∀A ∈ D we have C(A)= argmaxx∈(A|fθ) g(x).
For the sake of concreteness, we provide an illustration of how the functions f , θ, and
g interact to determine choice behavior, using a multiplicative notation for enumerated
sets.
Example 1. Let f (x) = 1, f (y) = 0, f (z) = 2, g(x) = 1, g(y) = 1, g(z) = 0, θ(xy) = 1,
θ(xz)= 2, θ(yz)= 0, and θ(xyz)= 0. The profile 〈fθg〉 is then a TST representation of
the choice function given by C(xy)= x, C(xz)= z, C(yz)= y, and C(xyz)= xy. ♦
Among other things, this demonstrates that the TST model can accommodate cycli-
cal binary choices. However, a slight modification to the choice function in this example
suffices to show that not all varieties of behavior are allowed.
Example 2. Let C(xy) = x, C(xz) = z, C(yz) = y, and C(xyz) = xyz. If 〈fθg〉 were a
TST representation of C, then C(xyz) = xyz would imply g(x) = g(y) = g(z). But then
the remaining choice data would imply f (x) ≥ θ(xy) > f(y) ≥ θ(yz) > f(z) ≥ θ(xz) >
f(x), a contradiction. ♦
Determining the empirical content of the two-stage threshold model requires us to
identify conditions that distinguish choice functions that are consistent with a TST rep-
resentation from those that are not. To do this, we employ a number of binary relations
that are “behavioral” in the sense of being derived from C, beginning with the separation
relation.
Definition 3. Let x S y if ∃A ∈ D such that x ∈ C(A) and y ∈A \C(A).
In other words, x is separated from y when there exists a menu on which both are
available, x is choosable, and y is not. If choices maximize a utility function, then sep-
aration reveals the corresponding strict preferences. Moreover, indifference is revealed
by choosability from the same menu, encoded in the togetherness relation.
Definition 4. Let x T y if ∃A ∈ D such that x y ∈ C(A).
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It is also useful to define the transitive closure of T , which we refer to as the extended
togetherness relation.
Definition 5. Let x E y if ∃z1 z2     zn ∈X such that x= z1 T z2 T · · · T zn = y.
Note that since T is both reflexive and symmetric, E is an equivalence.2 In classi-
cal revealed preference analysis, E-equivalence classes amount to revealed indifference
curves.
When C has a TST representation 〈fθg〉 instead of an ordinary utility represen-
tation, the relations S and T must be interpreted differently. Here x S y implies either
f (x) > f(y) or g(x) > g(y), since the separation of x from y must occur—speaking in
terms of the representation—at either the first or the second stage. Meanwhile, xT y tells
us nothing about the first stage but ensures that g(x) = g(y), and likewise for extended
togetherness.
Though neither S nor T by itself says anything definitive about the first stage of a TST
representation, they can be used together to elicit such information. Indeed, we saw
this already in Example 2, where xT y implied g(x)= g(y), and so xS y could only mean
that f (x) > f(y). This remains true for alternatives related by extended togetherness,
which is to say that separations between alternatives in the same E-equivalence class
must be attributed to the first stage. To capture this reasoning, we define the first-stage
separation relation.
Definition 6. Let x F y if both x E y and x S y.
This definition suggests a necessary condition for the TST model. Example 2 shows
how x F y F z F x leads to a contradiction, and an F-cycle of any length would yield
the same result. The condition is thus that the first-stage separation relation be acyclic,
i.e., that there be no S-cycle within an E-equivalence class.3 Note that this is satisfied
in Example 1, where E partitions the alternatives as {xy z} and the S-cycles present are
x S y S z S x and x S z S x.
Remarkably, acyclicity of F turns out also to be sufficient for the TST framework.
Theorem. A choice function has a two-stage threshold representation if and only if the
relation F is acyclic.
This result involves no monotonicity (e.g., contraction or expansion consistency)
conditions or congruence axioms of the sort common in the revealed preference liter-
ature. Likewise, no constraint links pairwise choices to those from larger menus, even
if pairwise choice data happen to be available. The single condition needed is straight-
forward to state, and its role can be appreciated in contexts as simple as Examples 1
and 2.
2A relation R on X is an equivalence if it is reflexive (∀x ∈ X we have x R x), symmetric (∀x y ∈ X we
have xR y only if y R x), and transitive (∀x y z ∈X we have xR y R z only if xR z).
3A relation R on X is acyclic if ∀x1x2     xn ∈X we have x1 Rx2 R · · ·Rxn only if ¬[xn R x1].
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The above theorem is proved formally in Section 4; here we merely sketch the argu-
ment for sufficiency. Given acyclicity of F , we first construct a secondary criterion that
is constant on E-equivalence classes and otherwise orders the alternatives arbitrarily.
We then construct a primary criterion that orders the alternatives in agreement with F
inside E-equivalence classes—the acyclicity condition ensuring that no contradiction
arises at this point—and otherwise in opposition to the secondary criterion. The thresh-
old for each menu A is set equal to the minimum of the primary criterion over the choice
set C(A). And it can then be confirmed that the resulting profile is a TST representation
of the choice function.4
Two special cases are worth mentioning. First, when the secondary criterion is con-
stant, the second stage vanishes and for each menu the choice and threshold sets coin-
cide.
Definition 7. A one-stage threshold representation of C is a pair 〈fθ〉 such that ∀A ∈ D
we have C(A)= (A|fθ).
Under such a representation any separation x S y implies f (x) > f(y), so clearly the
entire relation S must be acyclic. Again this necessary condition can be shown also to
be sufficient, yielding a characterization obtained by Aleskerov and Monjardet (2002).
Proposition. A choice function has a one-stage threshold representation if and only if
the relation S is acyclic.
The second special case is that of single-valued choice functions. When all choice
sets are singletons, the relations T and E are both empty, and hence F too is empty. But
then F is trivially acyclic, yielding the following corollary to our theorem.
Corollary. Any single-valued choice function has a two-stage threshold representation.
In this context, the sufficiency argument outlined above is much simplified. Since
E is empty, we can take g to be an arbitrary one-to-one function. Furthermore, since F
is empty, we can set f = −g. A menu’s threshold is, of course, the f -value of the unique
element of the choice set. With the two criteria one-to-one and diametrically opposed,
it is then immediate that the profile constructed makes up a TST representation.
3. More specialized models
To the best of our knowledge, two-stage threshold representations have not previously
been studied in isolation. However, several authors propose theories that overlap with
the TST model, based on a variety of hypotheses about the process of decision making.
4For instance, take the choice function in Example 1. Here since x E y we need g(x) = g(y), and we can
arbitrarily set g(z) < g(x). Since x F y we need f (x) > f(y), and since g(z) < g(x) we also need f (z) > f(x).
Finally, the thresholds satisfy θ(xy) = f (x), θ(xz) = f (z), θ(yz) = f (y), and θ(xyz) = f (y). Note that this
constructed profile is not the same in all respects—even ordinally—as the original profile in Example 1, but
nevertheless is a TST representation of the choice function.
880 Manzini, Mariotti, and Tyson Theoretical Economics 8 (2013)
1. Lleras et al. (2010) introduce a model in which the alternatives actively considered
by the decision maker are a subset of those available. To obtain behavioral restric-
tions, they require that for any two menus A and B such that A⊆ B, an alternative
x ∈A is considered in choice problem B only if it is also considered in problem A.
The TST framework generates a special case of this model if the primary criterion
f measures the propensity of an alternative to be considered, the threshold map θ
returns minimum f -values for consideration, and θ is monotone (i.e., A ⊆ B im-
plies θ(A) ≤ θ(B)).5 The secondary criterion g here represents an ordinary utility
function.
2. Masatlioglu et al. (2012) suppose that alternatives are preselected not by active con-
sideration, but rather by the decision maker’s awareness of them. Here it is as-
sumed that if all alternatives perceived in choice problem B are available on some
menu A ⊆ B, then the options perceived in problems A and B will be identical.6
Once again a special case of this model can be generated by the TST structure:
With f and θ governing awareness, and g measuring utility, a sufficient condition
for the above assumption is that A ⊆ B and max f [B \ A] < θ(B) together imply
θ(A)= θ(B).
3. Tyson (2011) studies a model in which the decision maker’s preferences among al-
ternatives are perceived imperfectly, the coarseness of this perception is increasing
with respect to ⊆, and the choice between perceived-preference-maximal options
is controlled by a binary relation that can be interpreted as a measure of relative
“salience.” This model admits a TST representation in which f is the utility func-
tion, θ returns satisfaction levels, and g is a salience mapping. In addition, the
model imposes the “expansiveness” restriction that A⊆ B and max f [A] ≥ θ(B) to-
gether imply θ(A)≥ θ(B).
These theories interpret the components of the profile 〈fθg〉 in quite different
ways. In particular, the first two models view the secondary criterion as the appropri-
ate welfare measure, while the third model assigns this role to the primary criterion.
Moreover, in the consideration and awareness frameworks, the threshold map controls
whether alternatives advance to the utility-maximization stage.7 This contrasts with the
third framework, where θ interacts directly with the utility function and implements a
form of satisficing behavior.
Interpretation aside, all three of the above models impose restrictions beyond the
basic two-stage threshold structure that constrain C in various ways. Since our theorem
identifies the empirical content of the TST structure itself, the incremental content of
5Indeed, many of the illustrations provided by Lleras et al., such as considering “the n cheapest options,”
are consistent with the TST special case. Related models are described by Salant and Rubinstein (2008)
under the rubric of “choice with frames.”
6In stating this “attention filter” assumption, Masatlioglu et al. let A= B \ {x}. But this is without loss of
generality when D = A, as they assume.
7Note that using thresholds to model phenomena related to attention and awareness is natural in light
of how the human visual, auditory, and other sensory systems operate (see, e.g., Anderson 2005).
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these additional restrictions amounts to the logical gap between our F-acyclicity condi-
tion and the axioms that characterize the more elaborate models. For instance, in Tyson
(2011) the combination of “Weak Congruence” and “Base Transitivity” is stronger than
acyclicity of F , and the extra logical force is what yields the expansiveness property of
the TST representation.
Of course, our corollary establishes that the TST framework has no intrinsic empir-
ical content when C is single-valued. Under this assumption, the axioms that charac-
terize a more specialized model use all of their logical force to impose restrictions on
the representation. For example, the TST special case of the consideration model in
Lleras et al. (2010) lacks empirical content in the single-valued setting until we require
the threshold map to be monotone.
4. Proof of Theorem
Let C have a TST representation 〈fθg〉. If ∃x1x2     xn ∈X such that x1F x2F · · ·F xn,
then x1 E x2 E · · ·E xn and so g(x1)= g(x2)= · · · = g(xn). We have also x1 S x2 S · · · S xn,
and it follows that f (x1) > f(x2) > · · · > f(xn). Since both f (xn) ≤ f (x1) and g(xn) ≤
g(x1), we have ¬[xn S x1] and so ¬[xn F x1]. Hence F is acyclic.
Conversely, suppose that F is acyclic. Write K(x) for the E-equivalence class of x ∈
X , define K = {K(x) :x ∈ X}, and let  be any linear order on K.8 Let φ :K →  be any
representation of  and for each x ∈X assign g(x)= −φ(K(x)). The function g :X → 
so defined is the secondary criterion. Observe that x E y only if K(x)=K(y) and hence
g(x) = g(y). Finally, let x Q y if either x F y or g(x) < g(y) and note that then we have
xQ y only if g(x)≤ g(y).
Lemma 1. The relationQ is acyclic.
Proof. Suppose that ∃x1x2     xn ∈ X such that x1 Q x2 Q · · ·Q xn and define xn+1 =
x1. If xn Q x1, then since F is acyclic there exists a k ≤ n such that g(xk) < g(xk+1).
But since xk+1 Q xk+2 Q · · · Q xn Q x1 Q x2 Q · · · Q xk, we have also g(xk+1) ≤ g(xk), a
contradiction. Hence ¬[xn Q x1] and Q is acyclic. 
Since Q is acyclic, its transitive closure is a strict partial order that (as a consequence
of Szpilrajn’s Theorem (Szpilrajn 1930)) can be strengthened to a linear order P .9 Let
the primary criterion f :X →  be any representation of P . Furthermore, define the
threshold map θ :D →  by assigning each θ(A)=minx∈C(A) f (x).
Fix a menu A and note that, by construction, we have C(A) ⊆ (A|fθ). Observe
also that x y ∈ C(A) implies x E y and thus g(x)= g(y). Hence there exists a g ∈  such
that ∀x ∈ C(A) we have g(x) = g. To establish that 〈fθg〉 is a TST representation of C,
it then suffices to show that ∀y ∈ (A|fθ) \C(A) we have g(y) < g.
8A relation R on X is a linear order if it is asymmetric (∀x y ∈X , we have xRy only if ¬[y Rx]), negatively
transitive (∀x y z ∈X , we have x R z only if either xR y or y R z), and weakly complete (∀x y ∈X , we have
x = y only if either xR y or y R x).
9A relation R on X is a strict partial order if it is irreflexive (∀x ∈X , we have ¬[xR x]) and transitive.
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Now fix y ∈ (A|fθ)\C(A) and take any x ∈ C(A) such that f (x)= θ(A). If g(y) > g,
then since g(x) = g we have x Q y. Alternatively, if g(y) = g then K(x) = K(y) and so
xE y. Since also x S y, we then have x F y and once again xQ y. But from xQ y it follows
that x P y and hence f (y) < f(x) = θ(A), contradicting y ∈ (A|fθ). We conclude that
g(y) < g and thus 〈fθg〉 is a TST representation of C.
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